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ABSTRACT
While contractualism seems to solve some of the more pressing con-
cerns of other moral theories, it does not conclusively address the 
moral status of non-human animals. Peter Carruthers claims that con-
tractualism excludes animals from having full moral status. I argue 
that Carruthers’ arguments are fatally flawed due to his reliance on 
contradictory claims, unlikely assumptions, and flagrant violations of 
the contractualist method. However, Carruthers also claims that it is 
possible to treat animals wrongly and that doing so deserves moral 
criticism. This claim is based on indirect moral significance. Howev-
er, this position makes it impossible for Carruthers to avoid endorsing 
two extremely counter-intuitive claims. The work of C. Tucker and C. 
MacDonald allows us to demonstrate that contractualism does give 
animals full moral standing. They ground the criteria for a contract-
ing agent in three characteristics that animals possess. A look at some 
possible objections reveals nothing devastating to their proposal.
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Introduction
The contractualist theory of morality seems to solve some 
of the more pressing concerns of other moral theories, such as 
the counterintuitive results endorsed by utilitarian and deon-
tological systems. However, it does not conclusively address 
one of the current issues in applied ethics—the moral status of 
non-human animals. In his book What We Owe to Each Other, 
T. M. Scanlon claims that the moral status of non-human ani-
mals is outside the scope of contractualism, as the theory is 
concerned only with what rational beings owe to one another. 
Peter Carruthers, however, in The Animals Issue, claims that 
the theory can definitively exclude animals from the category 
of those with full moral status. I will first show that Carruthers’ 
arguments are fatally flawed, and therefore he cannot prove his 
case. Then I will demonstrate, using the work of C. Tucker and 
C. MacDonald, that contractualism does, in fact, allow for ani-
mals to be afforded full moral standing. 
As with other contract systems of morality, Scanlonian con-
tractualism is based on a type of agreement that contracting 
agents make with one another. However, this should not be in-
terpreted as a type of bargaining in which each participant en-
deavors to get as much as he can. The contractualist agents are 
attempting to discover a set of principles that can be reasonably 
justified by everyone involved. Scanlon provides the following 
contractualist method of determining whether acts are right or 
wrong, as he describes moral judgments in this manner:
[T]hey are judgments about what would be permitted 
by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by 
people who were moved to find principles for the gen-
eral regulation of behavior that others, similarly moti-
vated, could not reasonably reject (Scanlon 1998, 4).
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We know that an act is wrong if a person seeking general 
moral principles could reasonably reject a principle allowing 
that act. Similarly, an act is permissible if no one could reason-
ably object to a principle that allows it. It is important to note 
that, because this is a method of determining the content of mo-
rality, we cannot appeal to previously held moral beliefs when 
engaging in the contracting process. Moral truth is what we are 
seeking—not what we are presupposing. As Scanlon puts it, we 
do not reject principles that allow murder because murder is 
wrong. Murder is wrong because we reasonably reject princi-
ples that allow it. Moral prohibitions are found in the outcomes 
of deliberations—not assumed at the outset.
Scanlon does not claim that contractualism is an account of 
morality in its entirety. Rather, as previously stated, it is mere-
ly concerned with what we owe to other persons. As such, its 
scope is not intended to cover certain categories of moral ques-
tions, such as those pertaining to animals or the environment. 
However, we continue to attempt to ground moral rules regard-
ing such issues on the contractualist system. Peter Carruthers, 
in his book The Animals Issue, believes he can demonstrate that 
a contractualist system has no place for animals among those 
of moral standing. However, we can assign animals a type of 
indirect moral significance. Let us evaluate his arguments.
Carruthers: Animals and Non-Rational Humans
The contractualist methodology is built upon the notion of 
reasonable justification or rejection of moral principles. Peter 
Carruthers asserts that animals’ lack of rationality excludes 
them from direct participation in the moral framework, but he 
is unwilling to say the same of infants, the severely mentally 
impaired, those suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s and the 
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like. He claims that mere membership in the human species is 
sufficient for the possession of indirect moral standing.
Carruthers begins his argument with an appeal to the idea 
that contractualists are essentially focused on maintaining a 
peaceful and stable society. In order to achieve this, moral rules 
must be what he calls psychologically supportable—in other 
words, that rational agents should be psychologically equipped 
to live as they prescribe. Moral rules must be compatible with 
human nature, one aspect of which is strong attachment to in-
fants and elderly family members. To ignore such a fundamen-
tal facet of our character is to risk societal upheaval.
According to Carruthers, people care deeply about our young 
and old family members without regard to their status as ratio-
nal agents. Therefore, “contracting agents should accord moral 
standing to all human beings, and not just to those human be-
ings who happen to be rational agents” (Carruthers 1992, 2.2).1 
To do otherwise would be to reduce infants, etc. to the level of 
personal property. This would provide them with some level 
of protection, just as our property is protected through societal 
and legal injunctions. However, there would certainly be no 
guarantee that they could not, for example, be sacrificed for the 
public good (as long as their “owners” were adequately com-
pensated, of course). A society configured in this fashion would 
be extremely volatile. Therefore, contracting agents must come 
to the agreement that all human beings are worthy of being 
granted moral status.
1. Citations are in reference to a later essay titled “The Animals Issue,” which 
summarizes the book of the same name and can be found at:
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20
Issue.pdf
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The objection that first comes to mind is that some people 
care about their pets as much as other people care about their 
grandmothers. If the government were to suddenly decide to 
remove everyone’s pet dogs from their homes, there would be a 
societal outcry that would likely be accompanied by violence. 
The imagined consequences are clearly not that far-fetched—
there have been numerous violent acts committed in the name 
of animal rights. It would surely be even worse if the animals 
targeted were those with whom we have personal relationships. 
So, if contractualists are concerned with preventing societal 
chaos, why should dogs not have full moral standing under 
their system? 
Carruthers addresses this objection and claims that it fails be-
cause members of such groups as the Animal Liberation Front 
are acting “not out of attachments that are a normal product of 
human emotional mechanisms, but out of (what they take to be 
justified) moral beliefs” (Carruthers 1992, 3.1). Carruthers is 
correct in pointing out that the contractualist system allows for 
no appeals to antecedent moral beliefs. We can only account for 
moral principles after it has been demonstrated that no rational 
agent could reasonably object to them. 
While this response may succeed concerning laboratory 
mice and the like, it does not seem to apply to household pets. 
Our moral beliefs do not provide the impetus for the acquisition 
of pets and the love we feel for them. Surely the contracting 
agents would know that people are greatly devoted to their ani-
mal companions and, as such, realize that granting them moral 
standing would enhance social stability. Carruthers rejects this 
argument as well and offers two reasons. His first claim is that, 
while being attached to our infants, etc. is a universally hu-
man trait, attachment to pets is not. Rather, such bonds may 
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be attributed to cultural forces that are present in some places 
but not others. As such, perhaps rational agents might decide 
that society as a whole would be improved without such attach-
ments.
His second claim is that we are rarely, if ever, as attached 
to our pets as we are to our relatives. Thus, it should be easy 
for people to accept the notion that pets are, in moral terms, 
equivalent to private property. While we may love our pets, 
we do not believe that they are our moral equals. We do not 
keep a dog, for example, that threatens our child with a severe 
allergic reaction, just as we do not keep a carpet that poses the 
same threat. As the carpet is clearly secondary to concern for 
the child, so is the dog.
There are two responses we may make to Carruthers. First, 
a closer look at his two claims regarding our relationships with 
our pets will show that they are contradictory in nature. His 
first claim urges us to disregard our societal norms. While we 
(in this society) have a great deal of affection for our pets, per-
haps this is not ideal. It is possible that we might be better off 
without them.
His second claim is based on the fact that we are generally 
more attached to our (human) family members than we are to 
animals, even if they are our own pets. However, this evidence 
arises from our societal norms—to which we are prevented 
from appealing in his first claim! Are we to conclude from this 
that we are to adhere to our social norms or to discard them?
There is no reason to believe that rational agents, especial-
ly those concerned about social stability, would contract for a 
society without attachments to animal companions. There is 
overwhelming evidence that proximity to animals greatly en-
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hances the quality of our lives—in both the mental and physical 
realms.  Regarding Carruthers’ first claim, it is more reasonable 
to believe that such agents would approve of our attachments 
to our pets than otherwise. And as for his second claim, while 
granting that we probably should not keep the allergy-inducing 
dog, societal harmony would certainly not be served by tossing 
him into the dumpster with the carpet.  
Carruthers next discusses Scanlon’s proposal that animals 
could be assigned representation for their interests. While, as 
previously stated, Scanlon is not committed to addressing the 
standing of animals within contractualism, he is not opposed to 
the possibility that they are entitled to trustees who represent 
their interests in the contracting process. Such trustees would 
be charged with assessing moral principles from the point of 
view of animals. Thus, actions permitted by principles that 
would face reasonable objections from these representatives 
would be considered morally wrong.  
Needless to say, Carruthers disapproves of Scanlon’s pro-
posal. He claims that allowing for animal representation is com-
pletely incompatible with the essence of contractualism. He 
questions why we would find it necessary to assign representa-
tives to animals “unless it were believed that animals deserve to 
have their interests protected?” (Carruthers 1992, 3.2). But to 
believe this is to appeal to a preexisting moral principle—that 
animals are deserving of this type of consideration—before the 
contracting process has even begun. This is a violation of the 
contractualist system.
While this is perhaps the most compelling argument Car-
ruthers has yet offered, not only does it fail, but it is incom-
patible with his own views. As we have seen, he believes that 
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infants, etc. have full, yet indirect, moral standing.  This is not, 
as he puts it, some sort of “second class moral citizenship” 
(Carruthers 1992, 2.4). Because it does not arise from such in-
dividuals’ participation in the contract procedure, however, it 
is an indirect standing. Recall that Carruthers is willing to at-
tribute moral standing to infants, etc. because of the negative 
social ramifications of doing otherwise. But this standing does 
not consist of making principles regarding infants, etc. that are 
in the interest of rational beings. Such principles are in the in-
terest of the non-rational beings themselves. How is this de-
termined? Certainly a newborn baby is not qualified to act for 
himself in a contract procedure. His interests must be protected 
by a rational representative—someone who will advocate for 
what the child would reasonably accept or reject.
As we have seen, if we are concerned about societal stability, 
we cannot exclude either infants, etc. or animals from moral 
consideration. Thus, if infants and the like are to be represented 
by trustees, animals should be afforded the same courtesy. They 
need not “deserve” (in a moral sense) to be included in order to 
merit inclusion. It is merely the recognition that, if they are to 
be included for the same reason that infants, etc. are included, 
they must also be provided representation in a trustee system.  
Thus, if we are to accept the inclusion of infants, etc. in the 
company of those granted moral standing because we do not 
wish to risk social instability, then there is no justification for 
excluding animals. Carruthers has so far failed to convince us 
that infants and animals should be categorized differently under 
the contractualist system. Since the idea that infants and other 
humans lacking rationality have no moral standing is extremely 
counterintuitive, it is more reasonable to attribute moral stand-
ing to animals instead.
Jennifer Swanson
9
© Between the Species, 2011
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 14, Issue 1
Carruthers: An Argument for Indirect  
Moral Significance
Based on what we have seen, it is surprising that Carruthers 
goes on to assert that it is possible to, in fact, treat animals 
wrongly, and that those who do so are deserving of moral criti-
cism. If animals have no moral standing, how can this be? Car-
ruthers wants to accommodate our intuitions that treating ani-
mals badly is to act in a morally reprehensible way—that to set 
a cat on fire, for example, is to behave wrongly. In order to do 
so, he appeals to the notion of indirect moral significance.
Essentially, his claim is that such acts are wrong because of 
what they demonstrate about the character of those who com-
mit them. If we see a person set a cat on fire, he has exposed the 
cruelty of his character, and it is by this that we judge his act as 
wrong. Carruthers tells us that “we sometimes judge actions by 
the qualities of moral character that they evince, irrespective of 
any morally significant harm that they cause, or of any rights 
that they infringe” (Carruthers 1992, 4.2). To illustrate this, he 
provides the following example:
Suppose that Lazy Jane is a doctor who is attending a 
conference of other medical professionals at a large ho-
tel. She is relaxing in the bar during the evening, sitting 
alone with her drink in a cubicle. The bar is so arranged 
that there are many separate cubicles surrounding it, 
from each of which the bar itself is plainly visible, but 
the insides of which are invisible to each other. Jane 
is idly watching someone walk alone towards the bar 
when he collapses to the floor with all the signs of hav-
ing undergone a serious heart-attack. Jane feels no im-
pulse to assist him, and continues calmly sipping her 
martini  (Carruthers 1992, 4.2).
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Why do we want to say (as I assume we do) that Jane’s ac-
tions are wrong? As Carruthers points out, no harm comes to 
the heart-attack victim. As there are dozens of medical person-
nel around, someone quickly attends to him, just as Jane knew 
would be the case. Furthermore, the man had no claim on Jane, 
thus his rights were not violated. Perhaps he would have been 
correct if he had said, “Someone ought to help me.” But what 
if he had said, “Jane in particular should help me?” It is hard to 
say that he would have been correct in this. However, we still 
believe that Jane, in her inaction, has acted wrongly. Carruthers 
explains our intuition thusly:  “[I]t is wrong because of what it 
reveals about her. Specifically, it shows her to be callous and 
indifferent to the suffering of other people” (Carruthers 1992, 
4.2).
This example lays the foundation for his beliefs about our 
indirect duties towards animals:
They derive from the good or bad qualities of moral 
character that the actions in question would display and 
encourage; where those qualities are good or bad in 
virtue of the role that they play in the agent’s interac-
tions with other human beings (Carruthers 1992, 4.2).
In other words, setting a cat on fire is evidence of a cruel char-
acter. However, he asserts that a cruel character is bad because 
it will doubtless express itself through cruelty directed toward 
other human beings. This will explicitly violate the rights of 
those individuals who are harmed. Carruthers claims that this 
explanation accounts for our intuitions that to set cats alight 
is to behave wrongly, while at the same time it allows him to 
maintain the stance that animals do not have moral status.
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Is this position defensible? It seems that Carruthers makes 
an excellent point when he notes that contracting rational 
agents are not “calculating machines;” rather, we have “limited 
time, limited memory, and limited intellectual powers” (Car-
ruthers 1992, 5.1). We cannot always take the time to reason 
slowly and thoroughly when a decision must be made. Thus, it 
would be in the best interests of contracting agents to agree on 
a principle advocating the cultivation of certain character traits. 
This leads to the further agreement that people’s actions can be 
judged according to the qualities of character that they demon-
strate—regardless of other factors. We would be hard pressed 
to object to what he has said here.
However, it is not clear that this explains why it is wrong to 
set fire to a cat. It seems that Carruthers would find it difficult to 
explain why it is more wrong to perform the action than to sim-
ply have the desire to perform the action. If acts are only wrong 
because they are representations of character, then the act in 
and of itself has no moral weight attached to it. Intuitively, this 
is suspect, for we do want to say that it is more wrong to actu-
ally set a cat on fire than to merely have the character of a cat-
burner. Acts and desires are not judged by the same standard. 
But if the action is only morally wrong because it signifies a 
bad character, then we must discard our intuition. This seems 
problematic.
Furthermore, Carruthers’ position also forces him to endorse 
a second counter-intuitive claim. If setting a cat alight is only 
wrong because it is an expression of a cruel character, and 
cruelty is wrong because it will be directed at humans, then it 
would not be wrong to set a cat on fire if there were no other 
human beings on Earth. As long as other humans could not be 
affected by a particular individual, that person would have free 
Jennifer Swanson
12
© Between the Species, 2011
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 14, Issue 1
rein to treat animals in any manner he chose—regardless of the 
pain and suffering this would inflict upon them. Again, this is 
not a claim that most of us would countenance.
Therefore, it seems that Carruthers has failed to adequately 
defend any of his arguments. His attempt to separate the stand-
ing of infants, etc. and the standing of animals with an appeal 
to societal stability cannot withstand scrutiny. If maintaining 
order is a central concern, it is clear that animals should be 
granted moral standing. In addition, in attempting to explain 
away our feeling that it is wrong to treat animals poorly, he 
violates some of our deepest intuitions. While it is certainly not 
the case that intuition is the guiding force behind morality, such 
a glaring transgression compels us to investigate whether, in 
fact, contractualism might have something better to say about 
the moral standing of non-human animals.
Tucker & MacDonald: The Nature of Contracting 
Agents
So far, we have described contractualism as a moral system 
based on principles agreed to by rational agents. It is precisely 
this characterization that threatens to exclude animals from the 
scope of morality. But perhaps we are describing contractors 
too rigidly. Is rationality really a requirement to take part in the 
contractualist system?
C. Tucker and C. MacDonald, in their article “Beastly Con-
tractarianism? A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of 
Animal Rights,” claim that rationality is not necessary for an 
individual to be a contracting agent. What is important is not 
the precise mental mechanism that is used. This is not some-
thing with which agents should be concerned. Rather, what 
matters is that the behavior of the agent “can be reliably pre-
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dicted or, if need be, modified” (Tucker and MacDonald 2004, 
9). The problem, as they see it, is that we have been interpreting 
the “contract” too literally. To realize that it is just a metaphor 
will enable us to lessen the demands upon those who would 
take part in the system. As they put it:
That there is a contract... only requires (roughly) that 
each party to the contract modify its behaviour in a way 
that enhances the utility of at least some other parties to 
the contract, and that each party to the contract benefit 
by being a party (Tucker and MacDonald 2004, 9).
This allows contractualists to include beings in our moral sys-
tem that common sense says should be included, such as in-
fants, the mentally deficient, and animals. They propose three 
characteristics that are collectively sufficient for engaging in 
a contractualist agreement: potency, vulnerability, and respon-
siveness. We will look at each characteristic and see how it re-
lates to animals.
Potency is the ability of an individual to behave in a range of 
ways that affect the utility of other agents. Without this ability, 
others stand to gain or lose nothing by refusing to contract with 
them. Such individuals would merely be treated with indiffer-
ence, and as such would not be able to be party to a contract. 
Animals are certainly potent in this sense. Our household pets 
can make us angry by disobedience and bad behavior, and such 
behavior can even affect our relationships with friends and 
neighbors. On the other hand, they also provide us with affec-
tion and loyalty. As we noted previously, pets enhance our lives 
in a number of ways—even including our health.  Animals in 
the wild meet the potency criterion as well. Most of them are 
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predators and, as such, have the appropriate physical appara-
tus—fangs, claws, poison, etc.  
The second characteristic, vulnerability, is the other side of 
potency. Contracting agents must be susceptible to being af-
fected by the actions of others. Without being vulnerable, the 
agent would have little or no reason to contract with others, or 
to change its own behavior. It would simply be indifferent to 
other agents. Pets are clearly vulnerable to the whims of their 
owners, but all animals are vulnerable to humans to some ex-
tent. Many wild animals are killed by humans or threatened by 
the destruction of their natural habitat by human encroachment.
The last characteristic is responsiveness. This is the ability 
of individuals to respond to others and to change their behavior 
in return. Without this quality, a potential agent would not be 
able to modify its own behavior when it sees that other agents 
have done so. It should be clear that animals possess this last 
criterion as well. Both domesticated and wild animals are ca-
pable of altering their behavior when rewards and punishments 
result from doing so. Any being that can be conditioned would 
meet this criterion.
These three characteristics are sufficient for contracting 
agents, Tucker and MacDonald claim, because the aim of the 
contract is to create the best possible relationship between the 
parties. The fact that an entity is both potent and vulnerable “is 
what makes it rational to ‘ask’ another to constrain its behav-
ior” (Tucker and MacDonald 2004, 10). “Asking”, however, is 
not to be interpreted in the human language sense. It might be 
something as simple as making it apparent that we are willing 
to do the same. In this sense, “asking” and “offering” do not 
necessarily require rational capacities. As long as an individual 
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is able to modify its behavior in a mutually beneficial manner, 
this is enough to meet the criteria for inclusion in a contractual-
ist system.
Objections and Responses
Tucker and MacDonald assert that they have provided a suc-
cessful defense of the claim that animals can be part of a con-
tractualist moral framework. However, it may be observed that 
their proposal does not address the fact that their three central 
characteristics come in varying degrees. Does this mean that 
moral standing varies as well? Or is there a minimum stan-
dard—and if so, what is it? Does a fish, for example, have full 
moral standing, minimal moral standing, or none at all?
One point that I believe can be easily addressed is that moral 
standing in a contractualist system is not the sort of thing that 
admits of degrees. An individual either possesses it, or he does 
not. The creation of a kind of moral hierarchy is in total oppo-
sition to our current project. While this could be taken to im-
ply that contractualism is simply not equipped to deal with the 
moral status of non-human animals, to accept this view is to fall 
prey to the common intuition that different kinds of beings have 
different degrees of worth. It is true that this belief has been 
defended by Mary Anne Warren among others. However, I do 
not believe this position is strong enough to result in a rejection 
of contractualism as a foundation for animal ethics.
Some individuals do not count more than others in a contract 
system—it is inherently equalizing. Even proposals to afford 
animals and/or infants, etc., “indirect” or “secondary” moral 
standing do not intend for those phrases to indicate a kind of 
attenuated value. The use of those terms is meant to refer solely 
to the way that such individuals come to be participants in the 
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moral system—not the level of their moral worth. The contrac-
tualist is committed to the idea that every contracting agent has 
the same degree of moral standing.
The more difficult notion is that of delineating between 
animals who have the relevant characteristics and those who 
do not. The animals that are generally subjects of concern in 
moral theorizing—dogs, cows, bears and the like—can be seen 
to meet the criteria. It is the “lower” animals that are cause for 
concern. Sometimes we simply do not know enough about a 
certain animal to determine its characteristics with certainty. 
Just as utilitarians are still trying to ascertain whether fish can 
feel pain, the contractualist is charged with determining wheth-
er fish have the qualities of a contracting agent. Intuitively, it 
seems that all sentient creatures will fulfill the requirements. It 
is difficult to conceive of such animals lacking the ability to act 
upon and be acted upon by others in the relevant ways, as well 
as the ability to modify their behavior when necessary.
However, it is certainly not impossible that such a being 
could exist, and there is a two-part response to this consider-
ation. First, it is better to err on the side of caution and grant 
moral status to undeserving beings than to exclude from such 
status those who belong. Second, if faced with such a creature, 
it would be very easy to fall into utilitarianism and take its abil-
ity to suffer as justification for inclusion in the moral realm. But 
as contractualists, this is not an acceptable solution. Perhaps we 
will simply have to bite the bullet and deny moral status in such 
a case. A more optimistic viewpoint is that, in a contractualist 
society such as the one we have been discussing, people will 
be sufficiently accustomed to treating all animals with moral 
concern that such a creature would be well treated as a mat-
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ter of course. That seems like a society to which no one could 
reasonably object.
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